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2ABSTRACT22
In a seminal paper, Hammerstein and Parker (1987) described how sex roles in mate23
searching can be frequency-dependent: the need for one sex to perform mate searching is24
diminished when the opposite sex takes on the greater searching effort. Intriguingly, this25
predicts that females are just as likely to search as males, despite a higher potential26
reproductive rate by the latter sex. This prediction, however, is not supported by data: male27
mate searching prevails in nature. Counterexamples also exist in the empirical literature.28
Depending on the taxon studied, female mate searching can arise in either low or high density29
conditions, and suggested explanations differ accordingly. We examine these puzzling30
observations by building two models (with and without sperm competition). When sperm31
competition is explicitly included, male mate searching becomes the dominant pattern; when32
it is excluded, male mate searching predominates only if we assume that costs of searching33
are higher for females. Consequently, two hypotheses emerge from our models. The multiple34
mating hypothesis explains male searching based on the ubiquity of sperm competition, and35
predicts that female searching can arise in low-density situations where sperm can become36
limiting. It can also explain cases of female pheromone production, where males pay the37
majority of search costs. The sex-specific cost hypothesis predicts the opposite pattern of38
female searching in high density conditions, and it potentially applies to some species in39
which sperm limitation is unlikely.40
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3In most sexually reproducing organisms, finding a conspecific mate requires some form of42
physical activity: at least the gametes, but often the organisms themselves, have to be mobile.43
Effort invested into mate searching, however, can be costly (Gwynne 1987; Acharya 1995;44
Grafe 1997; Okuda 1999; Melville et al. 2003; Kasumovic et al. 2007). Searching effort can45
be defined as a costly activity that evolves to improve mate encounter rates, whether this46
involves physical movement or some other form of active behavior (for example calls or47
pheromone production). For individuals of one sex, the problem is solved — in the sense that48
mate finding does not require any effort — if the opposite sex performs sufficient searching.49
Since males of a typical species benefit from multiple mating more than females (Bateman50
1948), they are typically expected to be the mate-searching sex, and females should51
consequently spend zero effort in mate-searching.52
There are two reasons, however, why mate searching deserves closer attention: one53
theoretical, and one empirical. Firstly, we lack a general theoretical explanation for the fact54
that males often take on the searching role. In a seminal paper, Hammerstein and Parker55
(1987) considered the mate search conundrum using a game theoretical approach. Their56
‘mobility game’ attempted to explain why one sex should invest greater search and movement57
effort than the other, and why males tend to be the ones that end up assuming the greater58
effort (i.e. females typically ‘win’ the game). Prima facie, one might expect males to be the59
more mobile sex if females invest more in offspring and represent a limiting resource for60
males (Parker 1978). Hammerstein and Parker (1987) found, however, that a searching male61
strategy and a searching female strategy were alternative evolutionary stable strategies62
(ESSs). The relative investment in offspring did not matter to the model outcome, and females63
could ‘lose’ both the game over parental investment and the one over effort spent in64
searching.65
4In other words, theory explains why one sex should expend greater search effort than the66
other (instead of both sexes investing equally), but it does not explain which of the sexes this67
should be. Thus, while it may sound intuitive that differences in gametic investment and68
consequent asymmetries in parental care explain why males search, modeling does not69
confirm this but predicts, instead, divergent searching patterns (here we use ‘divergence’ as a70
shorthand for a pattern in which current sex differences are magnified consequences of slight71
ancestral deviations in searching patterns). Since Hammerstein and Parker (1987), very little72
theoretical effort has been spent on this problem. The only examples we are aware of consider73
highly taxon-specific questions, such as payoffs that depend on the time of day in lekking74
insects (Ide and Kondoh 2000). This lack of progress is surprising, given that our theoretical75
understanding of sex roles has otherwise advanced considerably (e.g., Clutton-Brock and76
Parker 1992; Parker and Simmons 1996; Queller 1997; Kokko and Monaghan 2001).77
The second reason for further analysis is an empirical one. There are relatively few studies78
explicitly devoted to studying the relative roles of males and females as mate searchers and,79
among the handful that have considered the topic, there is a lack of consensus regarding80
factors that favor mate-searching by females. On the one hand, evidence suggests that females81
should expend greater search effort if search costs are low. Such a situation often appears to82
correspond to high density. In fiddler crabs Uca beebei, for example, females increase their83
mate search activities when crab densities are high; the abundance of nearby burrows at such84
densities reduce female search costs by allowing them to escape quickly from potential85
predators (deRivera et al. 2003). Arguments linking reduced search costs with female mate86
searching has also been suggested for moths (Greenfield 1981). Here, the adaptive reasoning87
is based on the contention that females are the limiting sex and thus should not be expected to88
pay high costs of searching.89
5On the other hand, evidence from other taxa suggests that high density can favor male, rather90
than female, searching (Kokko and Rankin 2006). In several species of frogs and orthoptera,91
for example, males, at low densities, use acoustic signals to attract searching females but, at92
higher densities, may switch over to a roaming strategy (Alexander 1975; Wells 1977; Davies93
and Halliday 1979; Byrne and Roberts 2004). Although one should keep in mind taxon-94
specific explanations, such as the need to avoid male-male competition caused by silent95
satellite frogs that join calling males (Lucas and Howard 1995), this alternative response to96
density has also led to a suggested general explanation of sex roles (Wickman and Rutowski97
1999): males should be the default searching sex because they have the most to gain from98
multiple matings but, at low density, females are selected to begin searching because any99
delay in becoming fertilized is costly for a female (see also Kokko and Mappes 2005).100
More generally, high search effort by females is not always linked to situations when costs are101
low. Evidence suggest that females are capable of expending considerable effort on mate102
searching even when confronted with high search costs. This is seen, for example, in the103
cardinal fish Apogon niger, where increased mobility by mate-searching females late in the104
breeding season is correlated positively with their rate of disappearance attributed, apparently,105
to mortality by predatory flounder and lizardfish (Okuda 1999). During their short life time,106
female butterflies Coenonympha pamphilus incur significant time costs by traveling to visit107
males at the lek (Wickman and Jansson 1997). In that species, it has been suggested that the108
fitness costs suffered by females, in the form of reduced fecundity, is ameliorated by potential109
indirect benefits of mating with males at the lek (Wickman and Jansson 1997). A similar110
argument has been made for pronghorn Antilocapra americana, an ungulate in which females111
in estrus spend considerable amounts of energy moving between harems before mating (Byers112
et al. 2005). Finally, there are also cases where both sexes invest in mate-finding traits. In113
many arthropods, for example, females produce pheromones, and males follow these114
6chemical trails (Greenfield 1981; Cardé and Baker 1984; Cardé and Hagaman 1984; Takács115
et al. 2002; Melville et al. 2003; Nahrung and Allen 2004).116
Here, our goal is to extend earlier theory and provide models that can produce the observed117
diversity of searching outcomes, including the ‘female pheromone’ case with large investment118
in males and a small, but important, investment in females. We do not base our model on119
particular features of any taxa. Instead, we aim at maximum generality by keeping the life120
history as simple as possible, and by varying parameters such as the mate encounter rate from121
extremely small values (representing slow moving, widely dispersed, solitary organisms) to122
very high ones (representing, for example, colonial species). We begin by defining mate123
searching effort in a way that excludes non-adaptive correlations between mobility and mate124
finding, and then proceed to building self-consistent (Houston and McNamara 2005) models125
of searching effort, one without, and another with, sperm competition. Our models validate126
the symmetry argument by Hammerstein and Parker (1987) that searching by either sex can127
diminish selection for mate searching in the other. However, our models also lead to two128
different hypotheses that can be used to explain the greater prevalence of male (versus129
female) searching, and we will examine their explanatory power in the Discussion.130
SELF-CONSISTENCY AND THE DEFINITION OF MATE SEARCHING131
We develop two self-consistent models where males and females attempt to locate each other132
for the purpose of mating. Self-consistency means that fitness must be evaluated by taking133
into account the fact that total reproduction by males should equal total reproduction by134
females, since every individual has one mother and one father. This simple fact, termed the135
Fisher condition by Houston and McNamara (2005), has been shown to be surprisingly136
important for developing correct predictions in conceptual models of reproductive behaviors137
7(e.g., Queller 1997; Webb et al. 1999; Houston and McNamara 2002, 2005; Kokko and138
Jennions 2003; Arnqvist 2004; Houston et al. 2005).139
In both models, we assume that females and males are free to invest any amount of effort (i.e.140
zero or positive) into mate-searching. We denote this investment by x for females, and y for141
males. Investment in mate-searching is assumed to increase the rate with which the searching142
individual finds members of the opposite sex, and to impose costs on the searcher. These143
costs are expressed as a reduction in some other component of fitness. In our particular model144
formulation, we assume that this component is survival (i.e. mate searching carries a mortality145
cost), but there is no reason why the conclusions could not be extended to other fitness costs146
as well (e.g., fecundity).147
Our cost-based definition of investment in mate searching resembles the definition of parental148
investment, namely, care that is performed at a cost to future offspring production (Trivers149
1972). To avoid drawing erroneous conclusions from our model, it is important to focus on150
these costs, because they help to distinguish between behaviors that are selected for other151
reasons but happen also to improve mate encounter rates, and behaviors that are selected152
because they improve mate encounter rates. For example, consider a butterfly where females153
have to locate resources required for the larvae to develop (e.g. a suitable host plant for154
oviposition). Females are obviously selected to fly until they find such a resource. For a male,155
it may be optimal to wait at a resource patch if he has found one, or to intercept a female that156
is making her way to the resource. The observation preceding a mate encounter is that a157
female flies towards a male; however, this should not, sensu stricto, be classified as158
investment in mate searching by the female, because no extra cost is incurred on top of what159
she would have expended in any case in her quest to find a suitable egg-laying patch (see also160
Groddeck et al. 2004). Thus x = 0 in such a case. If, on the other hand, she traveled to a male161
8lek before flying to the resource patch, the extra travel time involved presumably carries162
some direct cost on survival and/or fecundity. Consequently, one should classify the female’s163
behavior as investment in mate-searching, x > 0.164
SELF-CONSISTENT MODEL WITH NO SPERM COMPETITION165
We base our models on the concept of reproductive value and invasion fitness: a strategy of166
mate-searching can invade if, and only if, it yields higher fitness than the resident strategy167
(Metz et al. 1992). Fitness in this setting is a weighted sum of the number of different types of168
individuals that the focal individual contributes to the population, weighted by the169
reproductive value of each individual type (e.g., McNamara and Houston 1986, 1996; Taylor170
1990). Our model is based on a continuous-time setting, for the reason that males and females171
may spend quite dissimilar times in parenting activities. This implies that an individual may172
contribute, at any given time, to the future population in three ways: by actual offspring173
production, by surviving itself without changing state, or by surviving and changing state. All174
these options are taken into account in the concept of reproductive value, following the175
method outlined in Härdling et al. (2003).176
Following a tradition in the literature of sex role evolution (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1992;177
Parker and Simmons 1996; Wiklund et al. 1998; Kokko and Monaghan 2001; Kokko and Ots178
2006), we define the relevant states as ‘time in’ and ‘time out’ for both sexes (Figure 1). In179
our first model, mating occurs every time a male and a female meet in ‘time in’. There is only180
one mating preceding the production of offspring, and we assume that females cannot store181
sperm. We thus exclude sperm competition and multiple mating within one reproductive cycle182
of a female. Following mating, g offspring of each sex are produced. Both parents then enter a183
‘time out’ stage (sensu Clutton-Brock and Parker 1992), which makes them unable to mate184
again before a certain time has elapsed.185
9‘Time out’ activities may involve parental care, replenishing sperm stores, or any other task186
that must be performed before reproduction is possible again. Because sexes often differ187
greatly in their parental investment, the duration of the time out period can be very different188
for the sexes, which also limits their potential reproductive rate (PRR, Clutton-Brock and189
Vincent 1991; Clutton-Brock and Parker 1992). For example, with mortality rate 0.1 and time190
out TF = 1 for females, females can reproduce, on average, approximately 10 times before191
dying. By contrast, males with time out TM = 0.01 can experience reproductive events at a192
hundredfold rate compared to females during  the same time frame (were they able to find the193
necessary number of females with whom to mate; see Queller 1997; Kokko and Jennions194
2003; Arnqvist 2004).195
Female search effort, x, and male search effort, y, both influence the mating rate of females196
and males who are in ‘time in’. Females mate at a rate mF(x,y), and males at a rate mM(x,y).197
These rates are increasing functions of both x and y. In a population with an unbiased198
operational sex ratio (OSR), these two rates are equal. However, males and females can enjoy199
different mating rates if the OSR is biased towards one or the other sex. In a population200
consisting of b males : females in the ‘time in’ state, the mating rate for the two sexes can be201
written as mF(x,y) = ( , )Mf x y b , and mM(x,y) = ( , ) /Mf x y b , where f(x,y) describes the202
searching outcome, i.e. how mate encounter rates respond to mate-searching behavior of the203
two sexes. Because searching improves mate encounter rates, we have ¶f/¶x > 0, and ¶f/¶y >204
0, but many different functional forms are possible. For example, f(x,y) = xy assumes that both205
sexes must perform some searching before they can find each other at all, while f(x,y)=x+y206
describes a species in which mates encounter each other frequently as soon as one of the sexes207
searches sufficiently. The parameter M (M > 0) is used to compare mate encounter rates208
between populations or species (cf. Kokko and Monaghan 2001; Härdling and Kaitala 2005;209
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Kokko and Mappes 2005). Importantly, the operational sex ratio b depends on searching210
effort, b = b(x,y), since searching influences mating rates and consequently also sex-specific211
mortalities and the amount of time individuals spend in the ‘time in’ state. Equation (3) in212
Kokko and Monaghan (2001) gives the value of b once mating rates are known.213
To keep in line with our definition of mate-searching as an investment that carries costs, we214
introduce a mortality cost during ‘time in’ (other types of cost could be equally easily added215
to the model, such as mortality during ‘time out’, lengthening the duration of ‘time out’, or216
reducing fecundity for females). Thus, for females, the mortality during ‘time in’ is mF(x),217
which is an increasing function of x, while during ‘time out’ the mortality is fixed, mFO. For218
males, the corresponding values are mM(y) and mMO. Note that in a continuous-time219
formulation, the mortalities can take any value m > 0: values exceeding unity simply mean an220
expected lifespan below 1.221
The evolution of female and male behavior can be tracked by building a matrix for222
reproductive values that develop in continuous time (for details of the method see Härdling et223
al. 2003):224
dv/dt = vQ (1)225
Here, v = (vFO, vFI, vMO, vMI) marks the vector of reproductive values of females in time out,226
females in time in, males in time out, and males in time in. The transition matrix Q is given227
by228
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where, for brevity, we use notation mF for mF(x,y), mF for mF(x), etc. The elements of this230
matrix give the continuous-time per capita rates of changing from one state to another, where231
the states are listed in the same order as in the vector v but now columns indicate the current232
state and rows the future state. For example, column 1 lists two possible transitions made by a233
female in the ‘time out’ state. She may return to ‘time in’, which happens at rate 1/TF, and234
since this means changing the reproductive value from vFO to vFI (i.e. add vFI, remove vFO), the235
rate 1/TF appears as an addition in the 2nd column (the 2nd element gives vFI in v) but as a236
subtraction in the 1st row (corresponding to vFO in v). The female may also die, which237
happens at a rate mFO, and leads to a loss of reproductive value vFO and no gain — i.e. the rate238
mFO appears as an additional loss in row 1. Other columns are similarly derived. Reproduction239
happens at rate mF and mM for females and males, respectively, and this adds reproductive240
values of offspring g vFI and g vMI to the matrix equations. Note that offspring values do not241
depend on who the parents were, thus we ignore the possibility that mate searching evolves as242
a means to sample several potential mates and mate with the ones of highest quality; see243
Discussion for this limitation.244
Härdling et al. (2003) produced a method to calculate the selection differentials in a245
continuous-time setting with several states. When a resident population (using x*, y*) is at246
population equilibrium, the reproductive values v* satisfy dv*/dt = 0 (Härdling et al. 2003).247
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The equilibrium requirement yields the following relationships between reproductive248
values of states:249
vFI*/vFO* = 1+mFOTF (3a)250
vMI*/vMO* = 1+mMOTM (3b)251
and vMI*/vFI* = F
F FO
1 1
(1 )
g
m g g
-
- -
+
m
m
(3c)252
Consider a mutant female with strategy x in a population in which x* and y* are in use.253
Assume that the mutant is rare, which means that its search effort x changes its mating rate254
mF(x) via its effect on f(x,y*), but the operational sex ratio b experienced by the mutant is not255
significantly altered by its presence but determined by population-wide behavior x* and y*,256
thus b = b(x*,y*). (Obviously the population may shift to a new x* and y* as the eventual257
consequence of successful mutant invasion, and b will thus be recalculated for each pair {x*,258
y*} when determining evolutionary trajectories). The strength of selection at {x*, y*} is a259
partial derivative of the mutant’s reproductive value ¶vFI(x,x*)/¶x |x=x*,y=y*, where260
vFI(x,x*) = e–r* [vFO* q11 + vFI* q21 + vMI* q41]261
= e–r* [vFO* mF(x) + vFI* [mF(x)(g–1)–mF(x)] + vMI* mF(x) g] (4)262
Here, r* is the continuous-time growth rate of the resident population, which equals r* = 0263
for a population at equilibrium. Note that equation (4) is a continuous-time version of mutant264
reproductive values such as, for example,  eq. 17 in Pen et al. (1999). Using equations (3a-c)265
and (4), we find that the selection differential for female searching equals, up to a constant of266
proportionality,267
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A similar derivation gives the male selection differential269
M M
M
M M
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(5b)270
The conditions SF > 0 and SM > 0 select for increased mate searching in females and males,271
respectively. We will derive evolutionary trajectories assuming that searching in the two sexes272
evolves independently (no genetic covariances between male and female searching).273
No sperm competition: results274
The interpretation of equations (5a-b) gives a surprising conclusion: a difference in the ‘time275
out’ of the two sexes is not reflected in the equations at all. Nor does the species-specific mate276
encounter rate M influence solutions: while it influences mF and mM, it cancels out in the LHS277
of eqs. 5a-b.278
How should the independence of searching roles from reproductive effort (time out) be279
understood? The term 1/mF ¶mF/¶x gives the proportional increase in female mate encounter280
rates for a certain proportional increase in investment in mate-searching. The corresponding281
term for males is 1/mM ¶mM/¶y. Since the total reproduction in each of the two sexes is the282
same, and every mating leads to the same expected number (g) of offspring production, there283
must be equally many reproductive events for females as there are for males; they are also284
equally valuable. Thus, a given increase (say 1%) in the mating rate gives the same285
proportional increase in an individual’s fitness, regardless of which sex the individual belongs286
to, or whether mate finding is easy or difficult.287
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Nevertheless, equations (5a-b) allow for the possibility that one sex performs the majority,288
or all, of the mate-searching. As a whole, individuals of a given sex are selected to search289
more if their mortality is high (1/m is low), if the increase in mortality by doing more290
searching is relatively low (dm/dt), if mate-finding is currently a slow process (1/m is high),291
and if a significant increase in mate encounter rates can be achieved by increasing investment292
in searching (high ¶mF/¶x or ¶mM/¶y). The last two facts mean that one sex can rely on effort293
by the other sex. If, for example, the outcome of searching is given by f(x,y) = x+y, then 1/mM294
¶mM/¶y will be proportional to 1/(x+y). The more females search, the smaller is the incentive295
for males to do so (1/(x+y) decreases with increasing x), and vice versa.296
However, this does not automatically lead to the two equilibrium states of either male or297
female searching. Hammerstein and Parker (1987) pointed out that frequency dependence can298
imply divergent searching roles. Another mechanism inherent in equations 5a-b acts against299
divergence, however: searching costs may favor searching in the sex that currently spends300
little effort. The sex that already invests a lot in mate-searching will have high mortality as a301
result of doing so, and if searching has strongly accelerating costs, it is then more likely that302
further increases in searching are selected against in this sex. Accelerating costs mean that a303
little searching can be performed without great mortality risk, and only much more intensive304
searching carries significant costs. Such cases lead to solutions where both sexes invest305
equally much in mate-searching (Figure 2).306
The importance of the shape of the cost function is shown by a comparison between cases307
where the mortality increase with mate searching is fairly linear (Figure 2a), accelerating308
(quadratic; Figure 2b) or strongly accelerating (Figure 2c). In the first case, we predict that309
only one sex searches, and initial, incidental factors determine which one it is (Figure 2a). In310
the second case, there is a line of neutrally stable equilibria, and populations approach any311
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point along this line, again depending on starting conditions of ancient populations. Here,312
both sexes may search, but they will do so to a different degree: female mate searching is313
inversely proportional to male mate searching. In the third case, both sexes converge towards314
a single equilibrium, where they invest equal effort into mate searching (Figure 2c).315
Intuitively, one would imagine that widely differing parental roles (very different TF and TM)316
should give an a priori reason for males to search more than females. In our fully self-317
consistent life-history model, we have used a modeling approach that has become one of the318
standard ways to predict sex role asymmetries (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1992; Parker and319
Simmons 1996; Kokko and Monaghan 2001). Yet we simply reproduced one central feature320
of the influential model by Hammerstein and Parker (1987): the images in Figure 2 are321
symmetrical with respect to the diagonal, thus there is a fundamental symmetry between the322
sexes and either sex can end up as the searcher.323
It is possible, however, to make the equilibrium of one sex (say, males) be approached more324
easily than the other. This is achieved by altering the sex-specific parameter values. For325
example, increasing the female cost of searching by 50% compared to males, shifts the basins326
of attraction from a symmetrical case (Figure 3a) to one where evolution more easily proceeds327
towards male searching (Figure 3b). Arguing that searching is more costly for males produces328
an equally strong shift in the direction of female searching (not shown).329
INTRODUCING SPERM COMPETITION330
A close inspection of the ‘time in’–‘time out’ modeling framework, above, reveals a331
potentially unrealistic feature: females always commence reproduction as soon as they have332
mated once. Although this may be true for some taxa (speckled wood butterflies Pararge333
aegeria, for example, typically mate once and then spend the rest of their lives looking for334
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places to lay their eggs: Gotthard et al. 1999), in many species females often mate multiply335
before any offspring are produced (Jennions and Petrie 2000). This introduces sperm336
competition, and means that some (often many) matings do not lead to fertilization.337
We now introduce a biologically determined minimum time spent in mating activities — the338
mating window. For our argument it does not matter if it is asynchronous or synchronous339
between females; in the model it is kept asynchronous. The mating window is included in340
‘time in’, and females spend it acquiring multiple matings. Offspring can be sired by any male341
who mates with the female during the mating window. The duration of the mating window342
can be arbitrarily defined (we use unity). The duration can be short: for example in frogs, the343
mating window for a female could be simply the time it takes to release all of her eggs.344
During this time, several males may be trying to amplex the female, resulting in multiple345
matings (Byrne and Roberts 2000). In a seasonally breeding organism that can store sperm, on346
the other hand, the mating window can be a whole year, if a female lays eggs in the spring and347
uses sperm from males she has encountered up to a year before. Nevertheless, she may not348
have encountered many males, if the mate encounter rate M during this year has been small349
(e.g. a result of infrequent, perhaps once-a-year nuptial flights).350
To make biological sense, this means that the mean number of matings during a mating351
window, which we denote by N, and the species-specific mate encounter rate, M, should352
covary across species. Such a correlation will emerge in our examples, but the number of353
matings will also increase if either females or males search efficiently (high x and/or y).354
Inclusion of the mating window means that the OSR calculation (b from eq. 3 in Kokko and355
Monaghan 2001) becomes an approximation. To ensure that the approximation remains356
sufficiently accurate, we use low mortality values compared to the length of the mating357
window.358
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Since mate encounters are an intrinsically random process, there is a chance that the female359
spends the mating window without meeting anyone (Kuussaari et al. 1998; Rhainds et al.360
1999; Kokko and Mappes 2005), and in that case we assume that she cannot reproduce before361
she has completed another mating window. Denoting by p the probability that at least one362
mate has been found during a mating window, and taking note that each window is unity in363
length, her rate of commencing reproduction from the ‘time in’ state now equals p. If males364
are found as a Poisson process with a mean value of mF(x,y) (which implies N = mF(x,y)), a365
female will be unsuccessful in locating a male with probability F ( , )m x ye- . Therefore, p =366
F ( , )1 m x ye-- .367
The selection differential for females (equation 5a), up to a proportionality constant, now368
takes the form369
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For males, the situation is different. They will suffer from reduced mating success in each372
mating when females mate multiply, which correctly takes self-consistency into account, but373
the gains still remain linear: every additional mating improves reproductive success equally374
much. From each mating with a female, males gain g offspring if the female mates with no375
other males during the mating window, g/2 offspring if she mates once with someone else, g/3376
if twice, and so on. The expected gain from each mating is obtained from the Poisson377
distribution,378
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which gives the male selection differential380
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The terms bF and bM relate mating success to offspring production, i.e. they are the slopes of382
the Bateman gradient (Bateman 1948). The ratio bM/bF, describing how much more males383
benefit from finding additional mates than females, increases very strongly with multiple384
mating (Figure 4). When one mating window offers an abundance of mating opportunities,385
most matings are superfluous to females: they do not make a difference to whether she can386
commence reproduction or not, leading to a shallow slope ¶p/¶x and therefore a small bF. For387
males, each mating also brings about smaller expected fitness gains when there is much sperm388
competition (bM decreases with N), but every mating, nevertheless, contributes to additional389
paternity chances; bM therefore stays above bF, the difference increasing with N (Figure 4).390
Sperm competition: results391
Once sperm competition is included in the model, mate encounter rates have a strong392
influence on investment in mate searching (Figure 5), and the solutions show sexual393
asymmetries (Figure 5). High mate encounter rates (M) lead to solutions close to the lower394
left corner in Figure 5a, and they indicate little or no searching by females, and significant395
investment in mate-searching by males. The value of N, the average number of males a female396
mates with, is high in these cases. Low mate encounter rates, on the other hand, lead to very397
high investment in searching by both sexes, and increasing symmetry in effort spent by both398
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males and females (dots near the right end of Figure 5a). More intensive mate searching399
does not fully compensate for the rarity of mate encounters, as N stays low at this end of400
Figure 5a.401
It is notable that the same outcomes are approached, regardless of whether females or males402
were assumed to be the originally searching sex (Figure 5a). In other words, including sperm403
competition reduces the tendency for sex roles to be divergent (Figure 4 and 5a). However, if404
costs have a similar shape that produced divergent roles in the model without sperm405
competition — i.e. little acceleration and thus little ‘extra’ cost for the already searching sex406
to search more — and if the mate encounter rate M is low, then divergence can be found even407
when sperm competition is included (Figure 5b). Females are not very likely to find several408
males during one mating window when M is low, which explains its resemblance to the409
scenario without sperm competition. For example, the lowest value of M considered in Figure410
5b (M = 0.1) will retain female searching at equilibrium if they were initially the searching411
sex. At this equilibrium, N = 0.37, such that females will not find a male in exp(–0.37) = 69%412
of all their attempts to complete a mating window, and only 5% of females mate multiply.413
The model can also be applied to cases where mate location is extremely difficult unless both414
sexes indicate their presence in some way to members of the opposite sex. This is seen, for415
example, in many insect systems where mate-finding is mediated by pheromones produced by416
females to attract mate-searching males. In some extreme cases, sex differences in mobility417
(e.g. ability to fly) mean that females are entirely dependent on searching males who detect418
and locate the “calling” females (Alcock 1981). There may often be remarkable asymmetry in419
the effort expended by each sex. Females often only need to release minute quantities of420
pheromone to elicit a strong response from patrolling males. The cost of pheromone421
production has been little studied but is generally presumed to be small (Greenfield 1981;422
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Cardé and Baker 1984; Svensson 1996; but see Blows 2002). Males, on the other hand,423
usually develop extreme mechanisms to follow these trails (e.g. extreme sensitivity to424
pheromone compounds, Angioy et al. 2003), and may often suffer considerable mortality425
risks following the pheromone signal (Acharya 1995; Svensson 1996).426
Figure 6a shows evolutionary trajectories when the searching outcome is multiplicative, f(x,y)427
= xy, which necessitates some effort by both sexes before f(x,y)>0 is reached. Unsurprisingly,428
both sexes now spend some effort in mate location, but the overall shape of the solutions stays429
similar to that of figure 5: solutions become fairly symmetrical only once M is so small that430
multiple mating becomes fairly rare. When multiple mating is common, males perform the431
majority of mate-locating tasks. Figure 6b shows the effect of searching on individual432
mortalities. The effort that females accept to spend will have minute costs: they evolve to433
accept a mortality increase of less than 0.01%, when they find, on average, 10 or more mates434
(two leftmost dots in Figure 6b). Males, in the meanwhile, accept much higher costs.435
However, if an average female finds less than 4 males during a mating window, mortality436
increases of more than 10% become acceptable for both sexes, and in extreme cases (N = 1.28437
in the rightmost dot, Figure 6b, indicates an exp(–1.28) = 27.8% risk of remaining unmated)438
both females and males can perform activities that double their mortality, if these improve439
mate encounter rates sufficiently.440
DISCUSSION441
Recent theoretical literature has highlighted the need to reanalyze conflicts where442
reproductive activities can, in principle, be performed by either sex but, in reality, show443
strong sex biases. For example, female-biased parental care does not immediately follow from444
the fact that males can potentially reproduce more often than females. This is because actual445
(rather than potential) mating rates must be equal across the two sexes (e.g., Queller 1997;446
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Kokko and Jennions 2003; Arnqvist 2004; Kokko et al. 2006), and models must take this447
into account to be self-consistent (Houston et al. 2005; Houston and McNamara 2005). This448
so-called Fisher condition (sensu Houston and McNamara 2005) has important consequences449
for mate searching. The intuitive reasoning, that males search because a high potential450
reproductive rate imposes high opportunity costs on them if they do not search, turns out to be451
fragile (Hammerstein and Parker 1987). If we assume that the production of offspring452
immediately follows every mating (i.e. no sperm competition), either sex can end up453
assuming the searching role, and males should be no more likely to take on the greater search454
effort than females even if the sexes differ in parental investment. The reason why the455
opportunity cost argument fails is that a male cannot mate if there are no females available to456
mate with, and the Fisher condition guarantees that males on average do not reproduce any457
faster than females. Instead, our results predict either divergence (the sex that ancestrally458
searched more ends up taking the searching role, i.e. the “two ESS” solution found by459
Hammerstein and Parker 1987) or convergence, where both sexes search equally much. In460
either case, any notion that males should be automatically directed to the searching role461
merely because of differences in gametic investment remains unsupported.462
Our models do, however, predict sexual asymmetries in two different ways. First, in the463
absence of multiple mating, a greater prevalence of male than female searching can be464
predicted if some aspect of female biology makes searching more costly for females than for465
males. We call this the sex-specific cost hypothesis. Second, when we allow for sperm466
competition in the model, an asymmetry is created that predicts much more mate searching by467
males. We call this the multiple mating hypothesis. We consider each hypothesis in turn.468
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Does the ubiquity of male searching reflect the ubiquity of sex-specific costs?469
Sex differences in costs are probably common because males and females typically differ470
from each other in many aspects of their reproductive biology, and any differences such as471
size dimorphism or elaborate ornaments could cause the direct costs of searching (such as472
mortality) to differ between the sexes. Nevertheless, we consider it unlikely that sex-specific473
costs can explain the ubiquity of male searching in nature. For this hypothesis to generally474
favor male mate searching, costs should be systematically higher for females. It has been475
argued that this is the case when females already suffer high costs associated with some other476
aspect of reproduction. Greenfield (1981), for instance, suggested that mate-searching by477
female moths would represent a considerable cost in addition to those already incurred from478
having to locate larval food resources for oviposition. Nevertheless, modeling shows that this479
intuitive argument can be surprisingly fragile.480
The argument for why this should be the case requires considering both immediate and481
delayed costs of mate-searching effort, and we will first consider immediate costs. Our model482
assumes that mate-searching increases mortality in either females or males for the duration of483
time that they search (i.e. once they mate, this immediate threat is removed). The model484
predicts an asymmetry in the search effort if this immediate increase in mortality is larger for485
one of the sexes, but this prediction is independent of any other life history difference. If there486
is, for example, sexual size dimorphism, this may select for searching by the smaller sex if487
small individuals are better able to avoid predation while moving. But if predation is size-488
independent, then no sex difference is predicted despite the fact that the large and the small489
sex otherwise may follow different life histories (e.g. their vulnerability to starvation may490
differ). Thus, to evaluate if immediate costs support the role of the sex-specific hypothesis as491
an explanation of male mate searching, one needs to estimate if mortality per unit of searching492
is larger for females. This is obviously challenging as differences in the actual mobility of the493
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two sexes must be controlled for: instead of comparing current costs of searching, the494
question is how dangerous searching would be for one sex if it searched equally much as the495
other. One way to equalize mobility experimentally is to set it to zero: the use of immobile,496
man-made ‘model’ animals (e.g. lizards made out of clay, Husak et al. 2006) can control for497
such biases but extrapolation will be required when applying such data to live, mobile498
individuals.499
Keeping this caveat is mind, what is the evidence? Females may fall prey more easily in500
species with female-biased sexual size dimorphism (e.g. guppies Poecilia reticulata:501
Pocklington and Dill 1995) but, in general, we doubt that there is a general reason why mate502
searching should be more risky for females across all taxa. If anything, sexually-selected503
males, because of their bright colors, conspicuous signals, and/or elaborate ornaments, are504
often argued to fall prey to predators more easily (Gwynne 1987; Götmark 1993; Acharya505
1995; Koga et al. 2001; Stuart-Fox et al. 2003; Husak et al. 2006). Also note that opportunity506
costs and any sex-specific biases that are reflected in the OSR should not be included in costs507
of searching here: these are already accounted for by our model formulation through sex-508
specific ‘time out’ values, yet they consistently fail to produce an asymmetry.509
Immediate mortality costs of mate searching do not preclude other types of costs from510
occurring. Thus turning to the second question of delayed costs, it is possible that there are511
costs that extend beyond the immediate mortality threat considered in our model. Mate-512
searching typically not only consumes resources but also trades off with foraging, and both513
factors may compromise the condition of an individual and hence have a negative impact on514
its future reproductive success. Such costs are likely to affect the two sexes unequally. Female515
fitness is often limited by resources to make eggs, while male fitness is limited by numbers of516
mates. Thus females should be sensitive to costs of searching if these have an effect on517
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fecundity, and males should be sensitive to costs of searching if these compromise his518
future mate acquisition ability. Neither type of delayed cost was included in our model, and519
the sex-specific hypothesis could therefore be resurrected as an explanation of male searching520
if there is clear evidence that males rarely face a trade-off between current and future521
reproductive effort (in the form of effort to acquire mates) while females commonly do so.522
A direct comparison is again challenging, but a priori there is no reason to assume that males523
can perform mate acquisition ‘for free’, nor is such a supposition supported by the literature.524
There is by now ample evidence for a trade-off between current and future reproduction in525
males (e.g. Badyaev and Qvarnström 2002; Hunt et al. 2004): they need resources to develop526
their sexual displays, and mate-searching prevents foraging that is necessary to maintain527
condition and ensure future mate acquisition ability. Just how important this can be is evident528
in species in which only the males in best condition can mate at all: serious mate acquisition529
effort can be very delayed in such species (e.g. McDonald 1993; Owen-Smith 1993). When530
both male and female life histories are clearly shaped by delayed costs of current reproductive531
effort, a general statement that searching costs will be larger for females across various taxa532
would be definitely premature.533
Despite our inability to assert that searching is generally costlier for females than for males,534
an examination of the empirical literature reveals some examples that appear to support the535
sex-specific cost hypothesis. In fiddler crabs Uca beebei, for example, females search only536
when mate availability is high and plentiful burrows reduce sampling costs (deRivera et al.537
2003). In California patch butterflies Chlosyne californica, easy searching in high density538
conditions encourages males to abandon their regular ‘sit and wait’ strategy to one of active539
search (Alcock 1994). Our model cannot explain such cases by varying multiple mating540
opportunities through changes in mate encounter rates. Instead, we expect these shifts to arise541
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where variation in population density (or some other environmental factor that influences542
mate encounter rates) covaries with mate searching costs, while leaving mate encounter rates543
relatively unchanged (meaning that female mating chances do not vary significantly with544
mate encounter rates). The easiest imaginable situation is a case where densities vary but are545
always quite high, as in the fiddler crab example discussed above. Here, mate finding per se is546
not difficult for females, but sampling several males can be more costly than finding just one,547
and this cost may decrease with increasing density (see also deRivera 2005).548
The ubiquity of male searching most likely reflects the ubiquity of multiple mating549
Our second explanation, the multiple mating hypothesis, performs consistently better in550
predicting high searching effort for males and thus appears more robust in terms of correctly551
predicting the ubiquity of male searching in nature. It predicts an asymmetry in search effort552
despite the Fisher condition, i.e. the fact that the number of offspring fathered by the male553
population must equal the number of offspring produced by females, which makes arguments554
based on high male potential reproductive rates non-trivial (Queller 1997; Kokko and555
Jennions 2003; Houston and McNamara 2005; Kokko et al. 2006). When there is multiple556
mating, the Fisher condition does not imply that individual females and males improve their557
fitness equally much by experiencing one more mating. In our model, another mating will not558
improve a female’s reproductive output at all if she has already mated during the same mating559
window (Bateman 1948), but another mating by a male will always improve his chances of560
fathering offspring: thus SF ¹ SM is possible but only when at least some females mate561
multiply.562
The multiple mating hypothesis predicts a shift towards greater mate searching effort by563
females when mate availability is low. Under these conditions females do not mate with very564
many males and may fail to find a mate quickly enough to optimize reproduction (Kokko and565
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Mappes 2005). As densities increase, and females are no longer sperm limited, males alone566
are selected to compete for access to any unfertilized eggs that remain (for an empirical567
example see Levitan 2004).568
The multiple mating hypothesis additionally predicts cases where females invest little in569
searching, but this small investment is very important for mate finding. This is seen, for570
example, in systems where members of one sex (usually females) produce pheromones to571
guide the mate searching efforts of the opposite sex  (the ‘pheromone’ case of Fig. 6). Such572
cases arise where mate finding is very difficult if one sex ‘does nothing’. For example, deep573
sea hatchetfish Argyropelecus hemigymnus males attend to olfactory cues that are released by574
females to facilitate their search efforts (Jumper and Baird 1991). Once again, the effect of575
sperm competition appears capable of driving shifts in the amount of effort that a female must576
expend, even if female investment is quite low to begin with (evidence suggest that577
pheromones are relatively inexpensive to produce: Cardé and Baker 1984). At high density,578
for example, the need for female gypsy moths Lymantria dispar to invest any effort in579
pheromone emission is made redundant; competition among males is so intense that they will580
actively search out freshly emerged females even in the absence of any pheromone trails581
(Cardé and Hagaman 1984).582
Both of our hypotheses predict possible phylogenetic inertia. One of the sexes can become583
‘trapped’ in a searching role if frequency dependence discourages searching in the sex that584
currently invests little in searching. This can maintain the original roles, even if the585
environment shifted to favor searching in the other sex. Phylogenetic analyses combined with586
information on population density could help distinguish between the two hypotheses: inertia587
should be weaker under the multiple mating than the sex-specific cost hypothesis, and when588
the inertia breaks, changes from male to female searching should occur in low density589
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conditions according to the multiple mating hypothesis, but in high density according to the590
sex-specific cost hypothesis.591
Further possibilities592
In addition to the two different hypotheses discussed above, our models can be used to593
examine further alternative scenarios. An intriguing possibility is that the search function594
f(x,y) itself is asymmetrical so that ¶f/¶x ¹ ¶f/¶y when x = y. Such an asymmetry should be595
rare, as there is no reason why a female that covers an extra distance of a given length,596
actively searching for a mate, should improve the meeting rate between the sexes any less597
than a male doing the same. Even pronounced differences in lifestyle, such as e.g.598
flightlessness in some female insects, will not change this symmetry: these differences are599
reflected in other parts of the model such as vastly higher costs of moving for females, and600
should not be doubly accounted for by assuming a poor search outcome if the female moved601
instead of the male. However, an asymmetry in the actual search outcome f(x,y) could arise,602
for example, if one of the sexes has better vision than the other: extreme examples are extra603
eyes of male mayflies (Kirschfeld and Wenk 1976) and bibionid flies (Zeil 1983). Such604
dimorphism would enhance any sex differences in selection pressures (mathematically, ¶f/¶y605
> ¶f/¶x). However, the extra eyes in these cases are believed to have evolved to enhance the606
pursuit of females and thus do not qualify as a pre-existing trait that has led to males607
assuming the greater searching role.608
Our model was designed to investigate the most basic form of mate searching, where potential609
mates do not differ in any direct or indirect benefits provided (nor is multiple mating assumed610
to be detrimental to either sex, but see Arnqvist and Rowe 2005). While this assumption is a611
necessary first step in a general model of the evolution of mate-location traits, an obvious next612
step is to incorporate the possibility of mate sampling to improve mate quality (Byers et al.613
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2005; Dunn and Whittingham 2007), perhaps together with costs or benefits of multiple614
mating. This could potentially increase the prevalence of female searching if mate-search615
improves mate quality, and provide an additional reason why sex-specific searching patterns616
can respond to density. For example, the prospects of finding a high quality male may become617
worthwhile at high density where there are many males to choose from, while at low density618
such prospects might be too poor to pursue (Kokko and Rankin 2006). This could potentially619
help to explain why the mate searching behaviors of, for example, the butterfly Coenonympha620
pamphilus (Wickman and Jansson 1997) and the California fiddler crab Uca crenulata621
(deRivera 2005) appear to fit the sex-specific cost hypothesis better than the multiple mating622
hypothesis. In the most complicated scenarios, females gain by choosing mates but also pay623
costs of mate sampling, both can vary with density, but changing female behavior with624
density implies that the prevalence of multiple mating varies too. Therefore, while the sex-625
specific cost and the multiple mating hypothesis do not perform equally well when attempting626
to explain general patterns, they may have to be considered together (rather than as mutually627
exclusive alternatives) when considering specific cases.628
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FIGURE LEGENDS795
Fig. 1 Flow diagram of the model. Females and males encounter each other when they796
are in ‘time in’; after mating, both sexes enter a ‘time out’ stage, but the length of797
this can be different for the two sexes. Mating rates can differ between the sexes798
too, because of a different number of males and females in the ‘time in’ stage.799
Fig. 2 Evolutionary trajectories without sperm competition, when evolutionary change800
per generation is proportional to the LHS of eqs. 5a for females, and 5b for males.801
The dashed diagonal indicates equal searching by males and females. In (a),802
selection always favors increased searching effort in the sex that initially searches803
more. In (b), there is a continuum of neutral equilibria indicated with the heavy804
solid line, and examples of single equilibria are indicated with dots. Parameters:805
TF = 1, TM = 0.01, M = 1 (though these parameters do not influence solutions as806
long as there is no sperm competition, see eqs. 5a-b), g = 2, f(x,y) = x+y, mFO =807
mMO = 0.1, and (a) mF(x) = 0.1 (1+x1.2) and mM(y) = 0.1 (1+y1.2), (b) mF(x) = 0.1808
(1+x2) and mM(y) = 0.1 (1+y2), (c) mF(x) = 0.1 (1+x2.5) and mM(y) = 0.1 (1+y2.5).809
Fig. 3 Evolutionary trajectories without sperm competition can become asymmetrical if810
costs of searching differ between the sexes. Solutions and parameter values are811
calculated as in figure 2b, but now with a non-linear searching outcome f(x,y) =812
x y+ , and (a) equal costs for each sex, mF(x) = 0.1 (1+x1.2) and mM(y) = 0.1813
(1+y1.2), or (b) female search cost is 50% higher, mF(x) = 0.1 (1+1.5x1.2) and mM(y)814
= 0.1 (1+y1.2).815
Fig. 4 The Bateman gradients, i.e. the reproductive benefits bM and bF for female and816
males, respectively, from improved mate encounter rates, and the ratio bM/bF, for817
36
different values of the average number of matings per mating window, N. The818
decrease in both bF and bM with N reflects that each mating becomes less819
important as a determinant of fitness. However, the decrease in bF is much820
steeper, therefore bM/bF > 1 which implies stronger selection for males to search821
for mates. Figure is calculated with g = 1 and mM = 1. A lower value of mM (e.g.822
due to a male-biased OSR) would further exaggerate the difference between bM823
and bF, while g has no effect on bM/bF.824
Fig. 5 Evolutionary trajectories with sperm competition. Solutions and parameter values825
as in figure 2b, but now the different curves do not correspond to different starting826
points {x,y} but to different values of species-specific mate encounter rate, M. M827
takes values, from left to right, M = 100, 50, 20, 10, 5, 3, 2, 1, 0.5, and 0.1. In (a),828
costs accelerate as in figure 2b: mF(x) = 0.1 (1+x2) and mM(y) = 0.1 (1+y2). In (b),829
costs are more linear than in (a): mF(x) = 0.1 (1+x1.8) and mM(y) = 0.1 (1+y1.8).830
Except for extremely low mate encounter rates in (b), there is a single equilibrium831
in each case, and males search more than females. At the equilibrium marked with832
a dot, the value of N becomes (from left to right) (a) 432, 170, 50, 19.9, 7.9, 4.4,833
2.9, 1.5, 0.78 and 0.19, and (b) 359, 148, 46, 18.5, 7.6, 4.2, 2.8, 1.4, 0.77 and (for834
the female-searching equilibrium) 0.37. Note that females search almost as much835
as males when low M limits multiple mating (equilibria with low N).836
Fig. 6 Evolutionary trajectories with sperm competition, when some activity is required837
from both sexes before mates can find each other: f(x,y) = xy. Other values as in838
Figure 5a, except that M takes values (from left to right) M = 100, 50, 20, 10, 5, 3,839
2, 1, leading to N = 13.1, 10.8, 7.6, 5.4, 3.6, 2.53, 1.93 and 1.28. In (a), the raw840
values of x and y are given, while in (b) investment in mate-searching is graphed841
37
as the proportional increase in mortality during ‘time in’ caused by mate842
searching, mF(x)/mF(0) and mM(y)/mM(0). When mate encounter rates are high to843
moderate, females pay extremely low costs for their searching (the ‘pheromone’844
case), while lowest mate encounter rates may make both sexes increase their845
mortality by 100% or more (i.e. more than halve their survival).846
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